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L. C. Green*

An International
Criminal Code - Now?

I. Introduction
It has been suggested that the time may now be right to prepare a
codification of international criminal law, either with or without a
draft statute for an international criminal court. In fact, the
Foundation for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
held its third Conference to this end in Bangladesh in December
1974.
It must not, however, be overlooked that recent attempts by the
International Civil Aviation Organization and the United Nations to
establish a working enforcement procedure to deal with aerial
hijacking and other forms of terrorism failed, largely because of
opposition from the Arab countries and their sympathizers. There
is, therefore, a danger that any formal proposal in this field may be
regarded as an attempt to achieve by roundabout methods what
could not be secured more directly. Nevertheless, it may be
opportune at least to examine the background of this matter and
some of the proposals that have been made, and to assess whether
Canada, for example, might consider taking any initiative or active
role to this end.
II. The Pre-LeaguePeriod
It seems to be generally believed that the movement for the
recognition of an international criminal code and jurisdiction is a
product of the First World War and the provisions in the Treaty of
Versailles for the trial of the Kaiser, and of the period of the League
of Nations. It is frequently forgotten that as early as 1907 in Hague
Convention XII an attempt was made to draw up a statute for an
international court enjoying limited "criminal" jurisdiction. By this
Convention provision was made to appeal the decisions of national
*L. C. Green, University Professor, University of Alberta; Academic-inResidence, Bureau of Legal Affairs, 1974-75.
This was a background paper prepared for a colloquium organized under the
auspices of the Bureau of Legal Affairs, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect necessarily the
opinions of the Bureau or the Department.
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prize courts when the order of condemnation (if it affected the
property of a neutral power or individual or, in certain
circumstances, related to enemy property) was alleged to be based
on wrong fact or law. This Convention, however, never came into
*force and the matter of any form of international criminal
jurisdiction remained dormant until the Allied and Associated
Powers sought, in Article 227 of the Versailles Treaty, publicly to
arraign Wilhelm II of Germany "for a supreme offence against
international morality and the sanctity of treaties", and envisaged
the establishment of a special tribunal consisting of the five
Principal Allied and Associated Powers to assure "him the
guarantees essential to the right of defence." It is interesting to note
that the Treaty makes no reference to international law when
discussing the jurisdictional competence of the tribunal.
The tribunal will be guided by the highest motives of
international policy, with a view of vindicating the solemn
obligation of international undertakings and the validity of
international morality. [Moreover,] it will be its duty to fix the
punishment which it considers should be imposed.
For a variety of reasons, primarily because of the Netherlands
refusal to surrender the Emperor, Article 227 remained a dead
letter. However, in accordance with Articles 228-230 the Allied and
Associated Powers were able to ensure that proceedings were
instituted before the Supreme Court at Leipzig in which charges
were brought against a number of German officers for a variety of
crimes against the law of war. According to the Treaty, those
charged should have been surrendered for trial by the victorious
Powers, with the German authorities providing such documents as
were required of them. In fact, the latter refused to surrender
anybody and proceeded against the accused before German
municipal tribunals, and there took place what have become known
as the Leipzig Trials,' of which the most famous is The Llandovery
Castle2 which formulated the modem law on the defence of superior
orders.
III. Piracy-An InternationalCrime?
Even before this, however, international customary law recognized
that the perpetrators of certain acts could be regarded as hostes
1. C. Mullins, The Leipzig Trials (London: Witherby, 1921).
2. (1922), 16Am. J. Int'l. L. 708.
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humani generis, and tried by any power into whose hands they
might come. Perhaps the chief of these were pirates jure gentium.
Traditionally, piracy jure gentium has been regarded as an
international crime. As early as 1598 in his De Jure Belli3 Gentili
wrote "Piracy is contrary to the law of nations and the league of'
human society. Therefore war should be made against pirates by all
men, because in violation of that law we are all injured. .. "
Similarly, Sir Leoline Jenkins, a seventeenth century admiralty
judge, said in 1668 that "all pirates and sea rovers are outlawed, as
I may say, by the law of nations, that is, out of the protection of all
princes and of all laws whatsoever. Everybody is to be
commissioned and is to be armed against them as against rebels and
traitors, to subdue and to root them out". 4 While in The Le Louis 5 ,
Lord Stowell stated that "with professed pirates there is no state of
peace. They are the enemies of every country and at all times, and
therefore are universally subject to the extreme rights of war". It
has, however, been contended that all international law has done
with regard to pirates is concede the right to states, without
imposing any concomitant duty upon them, to prosecute any pirate
they may capture. On this ground it has been said that since the
application of universal jurisdiction depends on the enactment of
local legislation 6 , piracy is not a crime under international law
which may, in fact, acknowledge that international law is part of the
law of the land that may, as such, be enforced in the courts in the
ordinary way. 7 This view is to be found, for example, in the

Introduction to the Harvard Draft Convention and Comments on
Piracy: "Properly speaking, then, piracy is not a legal crime or
offence under the law of nations". 8
It should be noted that this statement, with its use of the words
"properly speaking", is completely in line with Austinian
positivism, and is based on the absence of any international
law-making body or court to try a person accused of this crime. This
attitude has as recently as 1974 been used as a basis for denying the
3. 2 A. Gentili, DeJureBelli Libri Tres (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933) at 124.
4. 1 Wynne, Life of Sir LeolineJenkins, 1724 at I xxxvi.
5. (1817), 2 Dods. 210 at 244; 165 E.R. 1464 at 1475.
6. R. v. Keyn (1876), 2 Ex. D. 63 and Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act (1878),
41 and 42 Vict., c. 73. (Imp.).
7. See, e.g., The Parlement Beige (1880), 5 P.D. 197 and Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Germany, Art. 25.
8. (1932), 26 Am. J. Int'l. L. (Supp.) at 759.
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criminal character of piracy as a standard against which to measure
the criminality of aerial hijacking. 9 To some extent it would seem as
if the Privy Council was of similar opinion in its findings in In re
Piracy Jure Gentium. While declaring that international law is
derived from treaties, State papers, municipal statutes and judicial
decisions, and from the opinions of jurisconsults, and as such rests
on a process of inductive reasoning, and although the Board was
concerned with piracy jure gentium, the Court nevertheless stated
with regard to crimes as defined by international law, that law has
no means of trying or punishing them. The recognitionof them as
consituting crimes and the trial and punishment of the criminals
are left to the municipal laws of each country. 10
But this same statement may be applied to any municipal law, for
while the statute defines the offence, it is the court which recognizes
it as a crime and ordains the punishment of the criminals.
It is submitted that this is an exceedingly formalistic and pedantic
approach. If the legal system defines the act as a crime, it is difficult
to appreciate how it may be contended that it is not thereby a crime
according to that system. Such an approach is akin to the arguments
of those who define law in accordance with the mechanism by
which it is created and enforced, provided that mechanism is
comparable to that which exists in the municipal sphere. But does
international law have to be "law properly so-called" in order to be
"law"?"
Perhaps one of the reasons for the confusion concerning piracy as
an international crime lies in the fact that many countries have
national legislation by which offences wider than the international
concept of piracy jure gentium are described and punished as
piracy. This may be seen from Lord Stowell's judgment in The Le
Louis1 2 rejecting an attempt to condemn a French slave-trader as if
it was a pirate in accordance with the Slave Trade Act 1811.13 By
the Slave Trade Act 182414 any British subject indulging in this
trade "shall be deemed and adjudged guilty of piracy, felony and
9. See N. Joyner, Aerial Hijacking as an InternationalCrime (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.:
Oceana, 1974)passim.
10. [1934] A.C. 586 at 588 (P.C.) (Special Reference) [emphasis added].
11. See G. L. Williams, InternationalLaw and the Controversy concerning the
Word "Law" (1945), 22 Brit. Y.B. Int'l. L. 146; L.C. Green, Law and Society
(Leyden: Sijthoff, 1975), c. iv ("Is International Law Law?").
12. (1817),2 Dods. 210 at 246 and 248; 165 E.R. 1464 at 1476 and 1477.
13. 51Geo. 3, c. 23.
14. 5 Geo. 4, c. 113, s.9.
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robbery." This should be compared with s.75 of the Canadian
Criminal Code by which "everyone commits piracy who does any
act that, by the law of nations, is piracy" . 15 No reference is made in
the Code (or in any other statute) to the slave trade, although by
s.7(2), the English criminal law in force in a province before April
1, 1955 continues unless altered or affected by the Code, or any
other federal statute.
IV. Treaty-created "Crimes"
While piracy is perhaps the best-known of what are generally
regarded as crimes against international law, it must not be
forgotten that customary international law also recognized other acts
as amenable to the jurisdiction of any state capturing the alleged
offender. This was accepted by the "fathers" of international law
who did not hesitate to condemn as outlaws, who might be attacked
by anyone 1 6 or tried by any prince, 17 those who might today be
charged with crimes against humanity. It was not only the writers
who recognized the criminality of such actions. States too on
occasion were prepared to establish tribunals (which operated under
international rather than any system of municipal criminal law) for
18
the trial of such offenders.
By the nineteenth century treaties were being contracted which
declared certain activities to be criminal and obligated the parties to
amend their criminal law to any extent that might be necessary.
While the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, 181519 embodied a
solemn declaration condemning the slave trade this did not make it a
crime, 2 0 although the 1841 Treaty of London 2 ' declared it to be
piracy. There followed a series of international conventions,
culminating in the Supplementary Convention drawn up under the
auspices of the United Nations in 1956.22 This has been ratified by
almost all members of the United Nations, but it no longer describes
15. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 [emphasis added].
16. See Gentili, supra, note 3.
17. See H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres (Oxford: Oxford Press,
1925) Lib. II, ch. 20 at s. 40(1) and (4).
18. See "The Breisach Trial of 1474" in 2 G. Schwarzenberger, International
Law, "The Law of Armed Conflict" (London: Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1968) c. 39.
19. 64 C. Parry, ed., The ConsolidatedTreaty Series (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana,
1969) at 454 [hereinafter "Consolidated Treaty Series"].
20. See The Le Louis (1817), 2 Dods. 210; 165 E.R. 1464.
21. (1841-42), 92 Consolidated Treaty Series 438.
22. (1957), 266 United Nations Treaty Series 3 [hereinafter "U.N.T.S."].
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the slave trade as piracy, but merely declares such trading to be a
crime liable to serious penalties. It thus seems to be a retreat from a
crime under international law amenable to the death penalty, into a
crime defined by municipal law and punishable by whatever penalty
the state may consider apt for a serious crime. Perhaps it should be
noted that although Canada ratified this Convention in 1963, there
is, as mentioned above, no specific reference to the slave trade in
the Criminal Code or in any other legislation. Other attempts at
defining crimes by international treaties have related to, e.g., the.
white slave traffic, the first convention on which was signed in
1904.23 While this referred to a "criminal traffic", it merely
required the contracting parties to take steps for the protection of the
victims, but did not specifically attempt to deal with the organizers.
By 1933, however, the situation had improved from this point of
view, and the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Traffic in Women of Full Age24 provided for the punishment of
those involved in the traffic "notwithstanding that the various acts
constituting the offence may have been committed in different
countries", and required those parties whose law did not yet contain
adequate provisions to deal with the offences to make the necessary
legislative amendments. The United Nations Protocol of 194725 was
more in the nature of a procedural and technical instrument than one
of a substantive character.
It has not only been in the area of humanitarian law that efforts
have been made to develop international criminal law by way of
treiity. Thus, by the Convention for the Regulation of Whaling,
1937,26 the parties have agreed to punish infractions of the
regulations in question. Whether, this type of "offence" is
sufficiently grave to warrant inclusion in any International Criminal
Code, providing for universal jurisdiction by all parties, and
perhaps envisaging the final establishment of a court which might
possess exclusive, concurrent or alternative jurisdiction, is most
questionable.
V. Un Droit PdnalInternational
In so far as attempts have been made since the end of the First
23.
24.
25.
26.

(1920-21), 1 League of Nations Treaty Series 83 [hereinafter "L.N.T.S."].
(1934), 150L.N.T.S. 431.
(1950), 53 U.N.T.S. 13.
(1938), 190 L.N.T.S. 79.
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World War to deal with international criminal law on an organized
basis, the tendency has been to call for a code dealing with what
might be described as criminal acts by the state itself. The literature
to a great extent stems from the work done by V. Pella who, in
1925, published his La Guerre d'aggressionet la constitution d' un
droit rdpressif des Nations, followed almost immediately by La
criminaliti collective des Etats et la droit penal de l'avenir. These
were in fact elaborations of his 1919 doctorate thesis in which he
had envisaged the possibility of an inter-state criminal law with an
international criminal jurisdiction competent to deal with individuals, states and moral persons disturbing international order. That is
to say, he was concerned with maintaining law and order only in so
far as this required the suppression of crimes against peace and
security. In 1922 Donnedieu de Vabres had attempted a somewhat
narrower approach that did not purport to reach out to states, but
confined itself to the individual. In his Introduction a '9tude du
droitpdnalinternationalhe wrote that
Le droit p6nal international est la science qui d6termine la
comp6tence des juridictions p6nales de l'Etat vis- -vis des
juridictions 6trangbres, l'application de ses lois criminelles lois de fond et lois de forme par rapport aux lieux et aux
personnes qu'elles r6gissent, l'autorit6, sur son territoire, des
jugements r6pressifs 6trangers.
He was therefore concerned with the mutual enforcement of
municipal criminal laws, although at a later date he envisaged
universal jurisdiction with regard to offences which could be
regarded as directed against "le patrimonie moral de l'humanit6",
and which provoked a sense of universal opprobrium viz., slave
trade, piracy, traffic in women and children, traffic in obscene
publications and of narcotic drugs. 27 He was, however, fully
conscious of the strength of the concept of sovereignty and the
resistance that would be offered by states to the establishment of a
special tribunal. He, therefore, suggested that until this situation
changed, it might suffice to establish a criminal chamber of the
Permanent Court of International Justice which would enjoy
un pouvoir exceptionnel de revision A '6gard des affaires
concernant des crimes internationaux. Vis- -vis des juridictions
nationales, elle n'interviendrait alors ni comme tribunal d'appel,
ni comme tribunal de cassation. Ses attributions seraient
(Paris: Sirey,
27. D. de Vabres,LesPrincipesModernesdu DroitPenalInternational
1928) at 144-47.
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analogues Acelles qu'exerce exceptionnellement, comme juge du
fait, dans les relations internes, notre Cour suprerfie. Lorsqu'un
jugement relatif un crime commis en territoire occup6, h la
falsification d'une monnaie 6trang6re, au meutre d'un homme
d'etat 6tranger etc., aurait provoqu6 une 6motion susceptible de
troubler les relations internationales [It is interesting to notice this
last comment in view of the attitude of the United Nations
towards apartheid which has been condemned as a crime against
humanity 28 ], ce jugement s'il est devenu d~finitif serait, d'accord
entre les Etats
inter6ss6s, soumis Al'appr6ciation de la juridiction
29
sup6rieure.
VI. The ICJ and a PermanentCriminalCourt
Since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials when it became clear that act
of state would not be acceptable as a defence to a charge for
international crimes, and that the status of the persons accused
would no longer serve as a ground for immunity, pressure began
again in favour of a permanent criminal tribunal, rather than the ad
hoc bodies established to try the major war criminals, and which
might be considered as treaty-created national tribunals 30 .
Moreover, it was felt that a permanent body would remove some of
the criticism directed against these two tribunals and the national
military tribunals which had conducted proceedings against lesser
war criminals, and all of which had been criticised as one-sidedpost
hoc affairs. At the same time, it was recognized that little would be
gained by proceeding against any state as such, while the movement
in favour of the international recognition and protection of human
rights lent support to those who believed that any permanent
tribunal should be given a jurisdiction wider than that concerned
purely with inter-state crimes like aggression or offences against
international security. This tendency to seek the criminal liability of
the individual before a permanent international tribunal was to a
great extent a departure from the attitude of the League of Nations
era, when, moreover, most of the literature in favour of such a
jurisdiction came from European writers, although immediately
after the war Bellott and Phillimore had supported such an idea in
English journals.31
28. G. A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII) (1973).
29. de Vabres, supra, note 27 at 417.
30. Schwarzenberger, supra, note 18 at 467-68.
31. A. A. Sottile, The Problem of a Permanent International Criminal Court
(Geneva: reprint, 1951) at 6 et seq.
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It is unnecessary, in view, for example, of the summary provided
by Sottile to go into detail of the developments and proposals made
by various bodies or individuals between 1919 and the adoption of
the Genocide Convention by the General Assembly in 194832,
which clearly recognized the desirability of a permanent impartial
international tribunal to deal with international crimes of this
character. It must be remembered that until such a tribunal is
established, genocide is punishable by the state in whose territory
the crime has been committed. Since genocide is hardly likely to be
the consequence of private enterprise, but needs state compliance or
complicity, this is hardly likely to prove effective or practical.
While the Convention requires the parties to enact legislation to give
effect to the Convention, it does not create universal jurisdiction
such as attaches to piracy, and which would enable a state in whose
territory one accused of genocide is found to charge that individual
before its own tribunals.
Soon after the adoption of the Genocide Convention, the Sixth
Committee of the General Assembly considered the problem of the
international tribunal envisaged in that document, and the Assembly
invited the International Law Commission "to study the desirability
and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the
trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes which
jurisdiction will be conferred upon that organ by international
convention". By the same Resolution, the Commission was asked
"to pay attention to the possibility of establishing a Criminal
Chamber of the International Court of Justice" .3 The Commission
dealt with this matter at its Second Session in the light of Reports
prepared by Professors Alfaro and Sandstrom and concluded that
such a judicial tribunal was desirable and that its establishment was
possible. 34 At the same time, it adopted a statement of Principles of
International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and in the Judgment, 35 which may be regarded as a
statement of part at least of the competence of any international
criminal tribunal that might be created. Despite these activities of
the Commission, and its associated studies in connection with the
Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of
32. G.A. Res. 260 B (I1) (1948).
33. For background, see U.N., "Historical Survey of the Question of International
Criminal Jurisdiction", Doc. A/CN. 4/71 Rev. 1.
34. 2 U.N. InternationalLaw Commission Yearbook, 1950, at 1, 18, 379, resp.
35. Id. at 374.
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Mankind, 36 the General Assembly resolved to postpone consideration of this Code and of the proposal to establish an international
37
criminal jurisdiction until it had dealt with the issue of aggression,
thus indicating its view that offences connected with inter-state
relations affecting the peace were of more significance than crimes
like those traditionally regarded as contrary to international law
(e.g., piracy and the slave trade,) which merely affected the rights
of the individual and were committed by individuals, normally
acting on their own initiative and for private as distinct from state
ends. However, neither the Commission nor the Assembly has
concerned itself with a Criminal Code in the widest sense of the
word. While any suggestion to establish an international tribunal on
a permanent basis radically diminishes state sovereignty and has
usually been the basis for opposing such a tribunal, the Assembly
did appoint a committee which was able to draw up a satisfactory
statute for a court. 3 8 Even in its Report, however, this Committee
evaded the fundamental issue of the scope of jurisdiction. It merely
provided:
Article 1: There is established an International Criminal Court
to try natural persons accused of crimes generally recognized
under international law.
Article 2: The Court shall apply international law, including
international criminal law, and where appropriate, national law.
Article 25: The Court shall be competent to judge natural
persons whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers,
public officials or private individuals.
Article 26 (1): Jurisdiction of the Court is not to be presumed.
(2): A State may confer jurisdiction upon the Court by
convention, by special agreement or by unilateral declaration.
(3): Conferment of jurisdiction signifies the right to seize the
Court, and the duty to accept its jurisdiction subject to such
provisions as the State or States have specified.
(4): Unless otherwise provided for in the instrument conferring
jurisdiction upon the Court, the laws of a State determining
national jurisdiction shall not be affected.
Article 27: No person shall be tried before the Court unless
jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Court by the State or
36. 2 U.N. internationalLaw Commission Yearbook, 1954, at 149.
37. G.A. Res. 897, 898 (IX) (1954).
38. "Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction",
G.A., Official Records, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 12, Doc. A/2645.
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States of which he is a national and by the State or States in
which the crime is alleged to have been committed [There is
thus no attempt to incorporate any principle of universal
jurisdiction in the sense that any State concerned with the
suppression of crimes under international law should have the
right to institute proceedings, but see Article 29].
Article 28: A State may withdraw its conferment of jurisdiction
[effective after one year's notice].
Article 29: Proceedings before the Court may be instituted by a
State which has conferred jurisdiction upon the Court over such
offences as are involved in those proceedings [provided, in the
light of Article 27, that the State of nationality and of the locus
actus have also conferred jurisdiction].
There was also the suggestion that the following additional
provision might be attached to Article 29:
In the interest of the maintenance of peace, a United Nations
organ to be designated by the United Nations may stop the
presentation or prosecution of a particular case before the Court.
This provision is reminiscent of Article 94(2) of the Charter
whereby the Security Council is able, for political or other reasons,
to prevent a successful party to an action before the World Court
from enforcing its judgment. It also introduces the possibility of
political factors interfering with the normal processes of a judicial
tribunal.
Now that the General Assembly has adopted a definition of
aggression 3 9 it may well be opportune to remind that body of
Resolutions 897 and 89840 and suggest that the question of an
international criminal jurisdiction be revived.
VII. The Nature of the Jurisdiction
Since the provisions of a statute for an International Criminal Court
are for the most part somewhat technical and even straightforward
in character, and since draft statutes already exist, 4 1 there is little
need to go into details on this matter. In any case, it may be
presumed that if real agreement were reached on the establishment
of a tribunal, technicalities as to composition, procedure, and
39. G. A. Res. 3314 (XXIX).
40. Supra, note 37.
41. See, e.g., supra, note 38; 1 M.C. Bassiouni and V.P Nanda, A Treatise on
International Criminal Law (Springfield: Thomas, 1973) esp. Part V; Report on
1st and 2nd International Criminal Law Conferences published by Foundation for
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 1973.
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possibly even jurisdiction, might be relatively easy to solve.
However, it might be suggested that the jurisdiction of this Court be
wide enough to operate on its own at the instance of its own
prosecutor; that any party to the Statute might have the right to
initiate proceedings, regardless of whether the country of nationality
or actus reus recognized the Court's competence; that the Court
might enjoy jurisdiction in absentia, which would partly avoid the
problem of an international police force, might evade issues relating
to claims of political asylum, and might also introduce the concept
of a declaratory judgment whereby the Court could declare a
particular fugitive hostis humani generis on the basis of a proper
judgment; that all parties to the Statute should, as with the European
Court, be obliged to carry out the judgments of the Court; and that
the Court might possibly be given authority over some selected
place which would serve as an internationally recognized
incarceration centre, thus avoiding some of the problems which
have arisen concerning Hess and Spandau and might also reduce the
risk of hostage-terrorism, etc.. On the other hand, the Statute should
probably avoid including as one of the "sources" of the law to be
applied "the principles of penal law generally recognized by
civilized nations", even though the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations are included in Article 38 of the
Statute of the World Court. The principles of penal law were
included by the United Nations War Crimes Commission in its draft
Convention for the Establishment of a United Nations Joint Court,
but this related to a court for the trial of war crimes and crimes
against humanity. Where a general international criminal court is
concerned, such a principle might lead to assertions that the Court
enjoyed jurisdiction over such offences as murder, for culpable
homicide is criminal according to "the principles of penal law
generally recognized by civilized nations". 42
It perhaps might be mentioned here that though Canada was not
represented on the War Crimes Commission it informed that body in
December 1944 that it "was interested in the establishment of a UN
War Crimes Court", and the High Commissioner's Aide-Memoire
of December 9,1944, stated that
[tihe Canadian authorities are anxious that the proposal for the
mixed military tribunals should be such that the trial of war
criminals may begin immediately Germany collapses

....

42. The draft statute of this court is reproduced, supra, note 33, App'x. 10.

It
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may not, in the view of the Canadian Government, be desirable
that these tribunals should be too hedged around with legal
restrictions and it might be useful to give them a wider
4 3 discretion
in order that justice may be meted out without delay.
VIII. The Nature of the Code
Whether a court be established or not, there still remains the
problem of drafting an international criminal code. The discussion
earlier in this paper concerning the nature of international crimes
and the concept of piracy should be enough to indicate that a
statement as broad and as simple as Article 1 referred to above is
inadequate, and fails to answer any of the problems or reservations
mentioned, and still leaves open the question of what in fact are
crimes under international law. Moreover, as became clear at the
second International Criminal Law Conference of the Foundation,
modem criminology is opposed to any codification that is in general
terms and does not specify the crimes in question by name.
Opposition was even expressed against the inclusion of a "saving
clause" to the effect that any court should also possess jurisdiction
over "such offences as may be named as international crimes
subsequently to the creation of the Court". 4 4
With the pressures for the protection of human rights, which have
since been politicised by the new majority in the United Nations into
rights of man in his corporate personality as part of a "people",
there has been an increase in the number of potential crimes under
international law. At times, however, the insistence upon treating a
particular activity as a crime appears more political-ideological than
real, and the decision to adopt such a terminology has often resulted
from the fact that the automatic majority has been aware that many
of the developed countries are, for political reasons, unable to vote
against the condemnation of a particular practice (the resolution
defining aggression was adopted without a vote), or only a very
small number of them are prepared to do so or are willing to be seen
in the company of those whose conduct is being condemned (e.g.,
the Convention condemning apartheid was opposed only by the
43. History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission (London: H.M.
Stationery Office, 1948) at 453.
44. Such opposition was expressed strongly by Professor Gerhard Mueller,
Director, Criminal Law Education and Research Centre, New York University,
co-author with E. Wise of InternationalCriminal Law (South Hackensack, N.J.:
Rothman, 1965).
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United Kingdom, the United States, South Africa and Portugal).
The tendency to be concerned with individuals and offences against
them, whether in isolation or as members of a group, also indicates
a shift from earlier practices. Thus, by the Convention for the
Protection of Submarine Cables, 188445, which became binding for
Canada in 1888, the parties undertook to make the severance of
such cables an offence; then, in 1929 there was the Convention on
the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency 4 6 which made certain
acts "ordinary crimes", and provided that these offences should be
treated as extraditable crimes, and that "foreigners who have
committed abroad any offence referred to in the Convention, and
are in the territory of a country whose internal legislation recognises
as a general rule the principle of the prosecution of offences
committed abroad, should be punishable in the same way as if the
offence had been committed in the territory of that country",
provided extradition cannot be granted for reasons not associated
with the offence. As to the type of offence that is now being talked
about as potentially a crime under international law warranting
jurisdiction on a universal basis, the League of Nations adopted in
1937, after the assassination of Alexander of Yugoslavia and Paul
Barthou, the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
Terrorism 4 7 which sought to deal with physicial attacks upon heads
of states and political office-holders, but was ratified by India alone.
The concomitant Convention for the Creation of an International
Criminal Act intended to try offences under the terrorism
Convention did not receive even this ratification. 4 8 Apart from this,
multilateral conventions in the field of international criminal law
concerned with the individual tended to be confined to slavery and
the white slave traffic, although trading in obscene literature had
been dealt with as early as 191049 and Canada has ratified the 1923
League Convention on the same subject,5 0 and the trade in narcotics
at periodic intervals since 1912.51
Whatever be the position under specific conventions calling for
the ban and punishment of particular acts under the municipal law of
45. 75 B.F.S.P. 356.
46. (1930-31), 112L.N.T.S. 371.
47. L. M. 0. Hudson, ed., International Legislation (Washington: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1941) at 862.
48. Id. at 878.
49. 103 B.F.S.P. 251.
50. 27 L.N.T.S. 217.
51. 108 B.F.S.P. 230.
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the parties, it should be remembered that not every infraction, even
though criminal, is grave enough to constitute an offence that
should be subject to the criminal processes of all parties in
accordance with the principles of universal jurisdiction, nor be
amenable to an international criminal tribunal should that be
established. Such jurisdiction should be confined to those acts
which are of sufficient gravity to warrant being treated as offences
against the general interests of mankind, either by way of his
patrimony or such principles of humanitarian law as may be
considered valid erga omnes. Since it would appear that the present
membership of the United Nations is rather more concerned with
acts like aggression or apartheid, which are acts committed by the
state itself, it must be remembered that states reach their decisions
and subsequently carry them out through the medium of individual
human beings, so that any process of criminal justice must be
exercised against the individual, as distinct from the juridical
personality known as the state. This means that the individual who
is charged must not be able to plead in his defence either "act of
state" or "superior orders". This is not the place to discuss these
pleas in any detail. It suffices merely to draw attention to them.
IX. The Contents of the Code
It has been suggested above that not all those acts which are
described by specific conventions as being contrary to international
law, such as interference with submarine cables or the dissemination of obscene literature, are sufficiently grave in the present
ethical context of mankind to be regarded as crimes that warrant
control on the basis of universal jurisdiction, even though specific
conventions might require their suppression and punishment on a
municipal level. If this be so, there is even less justification for
subjecting such activities to any international jurisdiction that might
be created. For this reason, any international penal code that might
be drafted should, at least in the first instance, be confined to such
offences as genocide, slave-trading, piracy, and the like, which are
contrary to the basic concepts of humanitarian law. Again, for the
purposes of this paper which is concerned with the nature and
desirability of such a penal code, there is no need to go into the
technical details of drafting, as has been done, for example, by the
Foundation for the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, nor is there any need to consider possible defences or
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whether a common penalty should be prescribed or the death
penalty preserved, or the like. For this reason it is felt that there is
no need to analyse such details as would necessitate the inclusion of
conspiracy to commit, incitement, planning, etc.. All that is
suggested here is a statement of those offences which are considered
sufficiently grave from the international and humanitarian point of
view that, pending the creation of an international criminal court,
states should have the right - and perhaps even be under a duty to prosecute them, regardless of where they have been committed,
or the nationality of the actor or of his victim. In other words,
confining the proposals to those matters which it might be
contended all states, since they are assumed to be concerned, as
members of the United Nations, with upholding and vindicating the
rule of law, should be competent to try in order that they may
contribute to upholding that rule of law. From a practical point of
view, however, it may be necessary to recognize that some states
will regard some of the offences listed as less serious than others,
and, therefore, the code might need to include a provision
permitting choice as to the offences which they are prepared to try.
It may also be advisable to provide that some offences are so grave
that no reservation of this kind is tolerable in respect thereto.
Any code of this character should provide a general introductory
clause along the following lines:
The Parties to this Convention are agreed that they will try any
person within their jurisdiction against whom there is a prima
facie case that he has committed an offence, regardless of the
location of the offence or the nationality of the offender or the
victim, contrary to international customary law or any convention
declaring the particular act to be a crime.
Then there should be a further provision imposing an obligation
upon all Parties to this Convention to amend their own municipal
criminal codes to give effect to the above requirement, including the
introduction where necessary of the right to exercise jurisidiction
over any offender found within the territory, regardless of the locus
actus or his nationality or that of his victim.
In addition, the Code should specify the following acts as being
among those over which universal jurisdiction extends:
1. Piracy jure gentium - this is to indicate that if any state has
passed legislation extending the definition of piracy beyond
that found in international customary or treaty law, there is no
obligation upon any alien or other state as a result.
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2. Slave-trading - it is difficult to appreciate how slavery itself
is made a crime, although it may be forbidden in the sense that
any attempt purporting to make a person a slave is null. It
would be possible to make the" owner of a slave liable to
criminal prosecution.
3. War Crimes - contrary to the laws and customs of war and of
those Conventions laying down rules for the conduct and
humanization of war.
4. Crimes against humanity as defined by the Nuremberg
Principles 52 , and including every act of homicide, likely to
cause death, committed in peace or war, against individuals or
groups of persons by reason of race, nationality, language,
religion, or opinion - this is based on the definition to be
found in the Code suggested by the 8th (Brussels) Conference
for the Unification of Penal Law, 1947.
5. Genocide - contrary to the Genocide Convention; this is
narrower than 4 above, since it deals with acts directed against
groups with the intention of destroying them as groups.
6. Trade in Narcotics - in view of the change in attitude towards
"soft drugs" it would probably be necessary to choose a
definition of the type of narcotics concerned to indicate that
only "hard" drugs are referred to.
7. Traffic in Women and Children - while it is true that the
Canadian Criminal Code (s. 194) refers to "any person" and is
therefore not sex-oriented, it is unlikely that others would now
be willing to accept such a wide view of white slaving.
8. Transmission of explosive and noxious materials through the
post contrary to the Universal Postal Convention.
9. Counterfeiting of currency with the intention of depreciating
the currency of a state or harming its economy - it is felt that
counterfeiting or forging for purely private ends does not
warrant treatment as an international crime.
10. Acts of violence against heads of state or other persons
enjoying international protection - it is not considered that it
is necessary to refer to the Convention on this subject3 in
order to avoid any suggestion that this offence is limited so as
to offer protection only to diplomats Whose states have ratified
the Convention; further, it is not intended that attacks on heads
of state or diplomats for purely private reasons should be
considered international crimes.

52. G.A. Res 95(I).
53. U.N. Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
International Protected Persons, G.A. Res. 3166 (XXVIII).
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Acts of terror 54 directed against innocent third parties or
committed in the territory of or against the property of any
state not directly involved in the alleged controversy which is
the occasion for such act - this would exclude the
internationalization of terrorist acts which arise from purely
internal conflicts, as in Northern Ireland, or which relate
solely to the parties in an international conflict, as between
Israel and her enemies, whether a state or an organization like
the PLO, although such acts might in some instances amount
to war crimes in which case jurisdiction would lie under 3
above.
12. Deviation of aircraft involving risk to life - subject perhaps to
the reservations in 11 above.
13. Aggression contrary to the United Nations Definition of
Aggression - although it might be argued that this is
adequately dealt with in 3 above.
14. Apartheid contrary to the International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid since the Convention describes apartheid as a crime against
humanity, it might be possible, especially as so many
countries, including Canada, abstained from voting, that the
definition in 4 could be widened and made more general.
15. Acts affecting the environment which can be shown to have a
permanent deleterious effect.
It is possible that 11 to 15 might be considered as "optional"
grounds for the exercise of jurisdiction.
It may of course be argued that some of the offences mentioned
here are "political" in nature and as such, in accordance with what
is often described as the general principle against the handing over
of political offenders, should only be tried by the state whose law
has been infringed, without any assistance from any other source.
However, it is submitted that this is to confuse extradition for
offences against a particular municipal system of criminal law with
jurisdiction over crimes against fundamental principles of the
international rule of law. In fact, the member countries of the
Council of Europe have already agreed to refuse asylum to terrorists
guilty of kidnapping and death threats and to extradite them to their
country of origin. 55 This appears to be partial application of the
principle aut punire aut dedere, for there is no suggestion that the
11.

54. See, e.g., L.C. Green, The Nature and Control of International Terrorism
(1974), 4 Israel Y. B. on Human Rights 134.
55. The Times (London), May 24, 1975.
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country in which the terrorist is seeking asylum is to institute
criminal proceedings against him in respect of that offence. It
should also be borne in mind that some countries are already
entering into bilateral extradition arrangements whereby they deny
any possibility for a highjacker to claim that he is exempt from
extradition since his act was politically motivated. This is to be seen
in the treaty between Canada and Cuba 56 , although this permits the
parties
.. . to take into consideration extenuating or mitigating
circumstances in which the persons responsible for the acts were
being sought for strictly political reasons and were in real and
imminent danger of death without a viable alternative for leaving
the country, provided there was no financial extortion or physical
injury to the members of the crew, passengers or other persons in
connection with the hijacking.
Similarly, the new extradition agreement between Canada and the
United States 5 7, which came into force in March 1975, denies the
character of political offence from attaching to aerial hijackings or
physical offences against persons entitled to special protection
under international law. This may well presage, at least in the case
of Canada, an intention to deny this defence in the case of offences
defined by international law.
In view of the political difficulties that are bound to present
themselves if any attempt is made to secure a code that is acceptable
to all (unless there are so many permitted exceptions that virtually
nothing of substance will be achieved in practice) there is little
doubt that from a practical and realistic point of view there is no
reason why Canada - or for that matter any other country should be prepared to take any initiative in the United Nations or
elsewhere at this moment. On the other hand, it may be worth while
from a jurisprudential or perhaps long-term point of view to seek to
place upon the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly,
or the International Law Commission, the burden of trying to define
what is meant by an international crime, although there may well be
more important issues to which these bodies should turn their
attention. On a less than universal scale, it might be opportune for
Canada to amend the Criminal Code in so far as this may be
necessary to ensure that those crimes created by conventions to
56. Canada, Treaty Series, no. II, 1973 [emphasis added].
57. 11 International Legal Materials, no. I (Washington, D.C.: American Society
of International Law, 1972) at 22.
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which she is a party figure in that Code. To the extent that she
believes other acts are so opposed to principles of world order that
they should be suppressed, there is perhaps no reason, other than a
historical jurisprudential philosophy, to prevent Canada enacting
legislation whereby any person primafacie responsible for such acts
would be liable to prosecution if found in Canada. This is not to
ignore the danger that other countries, with somewhat different
ideas as to what constitutes a fundamental principle of world order,
might pursue a somewhat similar line in a fashion that Canada
would find unacceptable and perhaps even revolting. Further, it
might be possible for Canada to discuss with like-minded and
friendly states (for at times some states might, for ideological
reasons, appear to be sympathetic to Canadian proposals, while
having no real intention to carry them into effect) the extent to
which they might be able to proceed on a joint basis, as is already
being done as we have seen in the Council of Europe. In fact, there
might be room for a number of such groupings to develop
simultaneously and eventually there might be co-operation or even
consolidation as between them. Moreover, there is no reason why
the two processes could not proceed at the same time, with Canada
moving actively on the regional or group basis while at the same
time being sympathetic to proposals that might eventually bring
fruition on the universal level.
While it may be unfortunate, we must probably recognize as a
matter of practical reality that we appear to be moving towards two
international laws - one for the world which exists on paper, and
one for those who are really prepared to live up to and carry out the
obligations they undertake, which will be narrower and far more
selective. Unattractive though this may sound, it may in fact be
inevitable in the relatively near future and it would be unwise to
close our eyes to this possibility.

